But there are many points of comparison, as well. The launch of a new warship was also a grand public event, and the naval race was therefore intimately tied to the rise of modern mass media. Nationalism was shaped by the printed word. However, the role of nationalism in pre-war politics, and the influence of the press in shaping and promoting it, remains unclear. Newspapers, in particular the large-circulation papers and periodicals, like the aforementioned Daily Mail in Britain, have often received a bad press from historians.
The written word in an age of mass media never pulled consistently in one direction, and any interested reader could pick up and read a range of different opinions in newspapers across the continent, apart from the limitations put in place by state censorship , of course. Countries with large left-wing parties also had large-circulation newspapers with left-leaning — and often quite explicitly anti-militaristic — opinions, and readers probably had a tendency to seek out and read the papers they agreed with, rather than radically change their own political standpoints if and when a newspaper told them to.
Even when newspapers and other publications seemed to argue for specific ideas, they were often read in different ways by a readership that was able to read and interpret such ideas according to their own convictions. For example, there has long been a tendency in scholarship to portray Britain, in particular, as fearful of foreign invaders in the period leading up to the outbreak of the First World War.
While some, like Robert Blatchford, dedicated their time and their pens to try to warn the public of the dangers of war and invasion, little research has been done on how the British public reacted to their warnings.
Fictional depictions of future wars and invasions could, however, enforce images of foreign threats, and thereby strengthen the feeling within a country that it was indeed threatened by outside forces.
One example here is Sweden, where Russia figured as a bogeyman for many future-war fiction authors in the decades before the war broke out. That said, it is doubtful if the stories on their own drove xenophobia or created the conditions necessary for war; after all, Sweden and Russia did not come to blows in Fear and jingoism may in any case — at least at first glance — have coexisted: an opinion often expressed in the inter-war years argued that Britain had in fact entered the conflict on a wave of public enthusiasm that carried the political decisions before it.
David Lloyd George claimed in his memoirs that the British government had the public solidly behind them when they intervened against Germany in the summer of Indeed, Lloyd George presented the decision as more the result of public pressure than the rational calculations of British statesmen.
Of course, Lloyd George had a vested interest in portraying the government that he was a part of as acting according to the will of the people. Verhey used newspapers to map the German reactions to the July crisis and the declaration of war, and found that, while there were certainly some crowds in support of armed conflict, many Germans were much more apprehensive. Imperial policies could often find both strong and vocal support within the pages of European newspapers. Commentators like J.
Hobson saw this imperial expansion as a potential driver for popular militarism, and while it would be going too far to attribute late th century imperial conquests to popular pressure within European society, there were certainly many who saw imperial possessions as a necessity for any self-respecting Great Power.
The scramble for Africa increased tensions across Europe, and fuelled jingoistic sentiments in newspapers and in patriotic societies. Italy had the luxury to wait and see which way the wind was blowing during the July crisis, and remained neutral in In May , however, nationalist crowds filled the streets, forcing Giovanni Giolitti , the leading light among neutralist liberal politicians, to admit defeat.
Italy joined the war, seemingly on a wave of populist militarist excitement. The Italian decision to join the European conflagration is a pointed example of how pre-war popular militarism can be a difficult animal to clearly identify, and how it could be shaped and fuelled by concerns and issues that were specific to certain countries and to their previous experiences.
The Italian example also shows how parliaments, governments and rulers could find themselves reacting to popular politics, rather than try to shape and guide it. Most of the other major European countries, however, found themselves in a different situation, as the events of July drove the decisions for war within the foreign ministries and at the high commands.
It seems clear that any widespread, popular groundswell pushing for war largely existed in the minds of statesmen like David Lloyd George. The blame for war in cannot therefore convincingly be laid at the feet of the European people, but should be reserved for their leaders. One European Great Power stands out in particular when it comes to the question of militarism: Russia.
The society of pre-First World War Russia was shaped in large part by its imperial project. But unlike Italy, for example, Russia was an imperial power because of its control over a large continental landmass, as opposed to overseas colonies. Yet Russian officials sought to emulate other colonial powers, like France, in its governing of this landmass.
Although the Russian case is an extreme one, other states were of course also largely shaped by a similar logic. As noted above, crowned heads of state were either titular or in various degrees de facto heads of both civilian government and the armed forces in their respective countries.
Indeed, the modern European state, with its efficient bureaucracy, taxation, and ability to register and mobilise its inhabitants, was to a very large degree either directly shaped by and for war, or eminently capable of being reorganised for the purposes of fighting one.
There were also clear links between officials in government positions and the patriotic societies in countries like Britain and Germany, as mentioned earlier.
Serving and retired officers served as members of the British Parliament, and the Junker class in Germany saw itself as natural leaders both in peace and in war. Private industry also had links with the armed forces and with politicians alike: when it came to Germany, the real or imagined influence of the Krupp family has gained almost mythical status, yet in liberal Britain and France, too, private industry and decision-makers in politics and in the armed forces were in close contact with each other before the war.
Whether such connections made a European war more likely or not is a different question. Politicians deferred to military planners — whether intentionally or not — in the lead-up to war, letting the logic of military planning and mobilisation take on a life of its own.
The push for war, or for decisive measures, may have been influenced by the way politics were, to a degree, organised around the conduct of war.
However, across Europe in the summer of the foreign offices worked towards their own solutions to the crisis. Of non-European belligerents, Japan seems to fit the description of top-down militarism best. In the aftermath of the Second World War, post-Meiji Restoration Japan was often pointed to as an example of a society where civilian authority had been subsumed by the power of the armed forces.
In the final decades of the 19 th century, certain civilian leaders often had extensive oversight over the armed forces, though this was partly due to some of them having been samurai prior to the Restauration. Without a clear and incontestable definition of militarism, it becomes difficult to make clear and incontestable conclusions as to its prevalence in pre-First World War society. Many civilians across Europe willingly joined patriotic societies, or supported movements for increased armaments, or dressed their sons and daughters in uniforms.
Enthusiasm for war — or for the symbols of war — took on different guises in different countries, but there were many similarities as well. Britain and Germany both saw their respective navies as a national unifying symbol, despite the more important role the German army held in German society compared to its British counterpart. Public displays of enthusiasm for the armed forces or for nationalist symbols or sentiments did not, however, necessarily make the public in general more likely to support a Great War in For many the spectacle of military parades and fleet reviews were just that: spectacle and entertainment.
We are therefore left with a somewhat mixed picture of pre-war militarism. On the one hand, military language, uniforms and symbols had to a large degree conquered civilian society — as evidenced by the youth organisations, patriotic societies and military and fleet displays so popular across Europe. Yet these symbols meant different things to different people, and popular militarism may not have translated into popular aggression. As for the governments themselves, the various degrees of influence the armed forces held over civilian society makes it difficult to see how much leeway the generals and admirals really had in the lead-up to war.
Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia , and Wilhelm II in Germany, had much theoretical power over both civilian government and the armed forces, but the exercise of this power was limited by many checks and balances — official or otherwise. These were not ancient despots, able to demand unquestioning loyalty from their state apparatus or their populations. If the pre-war states and societies could be said to be militaristic, it was therefore a militarism of degrees rather than an absolute and all-encompassing phenomenon.
All three countries think that Germany would be a threat to them. Nationalism is also one of the main causes that led to the crack of World War 1, since all the powers had a nationalistic pride.
Many nations believed that nationalism helps the nation to gain the support for war, in addition to competing with other countries on which nation is the better, stronger and most powerful. The greatest nationalist movement was the Slavic group in the Balkans. World War I began in and lasted for four long years. The Government attitude means that many generals had a huge influence on the government of the country, which led to problems, which then turned into long term problems, escalation into the war.
This also meant that all the countries were very aggressive, but especially the government of Austria-Hungary and Germany were militaristic. At the time of , the arm force was divided like that, that Germany had about 2,2 million soldiers, Austria-Hungary had about , Soldier and Russia had about 1,2 million soldiers. When on country improved their army and general armed force, all the other had the idear to grow, causing every country to grow bigger and better.
The naval race between Great Britain and Germany from to caused great friction among the two nations and was one of the causes for World War I. It began in and ended in America witnessed much devastation in this time period. In these four years alone nearly 9 million people died and millions more were maimed, crippled, grief stricken, or psychologically scarred Coetzee, World War I is considered by some, the first man-made catastrophe of the twentieth century.
Nicole Beliakov Geography Rise in nationalism in Europe is not a new phenomenon. The history of Europe is marred by two world wars, when nationalism flourished and led to the enormous loss of human lives. During these wars, manifestations of nationalism were especially overt and even obligatory because European governments needed a justification of wars in order to mobilize people, to maintain morale and readiness of citizens to provide labor, resources, and to sacrifice their lives for the cause, and nationalism was a powerful doctrine that provided such justification.
After the second world war, to avoid repetition of these tragic events, European nations began their steady advance towards economic and political integration, which culminated in the establishment of the European Union. Presently, the very foundation of the EU is under the threat due to nationalism, which has risen in prominence and popularity in the context of rising inequality, immigration of people of not only different ethnicities but also different religions, economic crises, terrorism, and shortcomings of EU system of governance.
Many scholars study about WW1 and what caused this huge conflict. Germany used to be responsible for this was, but after many controversial debates later, the blame was gradually put on the different great powers of Europe as well.
In this piece of writing, the main causes of WWI will be analyzed, especially targeting the long-term causes. World War One was a time of struggle in Europe.
Imperial competition also pushed the countries towards adopting alliances. Colonies were units of exchange that could be bargained without significantly affecting the metro-pole. They also brought nations who would otherwise not interact into conflict and agreement. It has been suggested that Germany was motivated by imperial ambitions to invade Belgium and France.
Certainly the expansion of the British and French empires, fired by the rise of industrialism and the pursuit of new markets, caused some resentment in Germany, and the pursuit of a short, aborted imperial policy in the late nineteenth century. However the suggestion that Germany wanted to create a European empire in is not supported by the pre-war rhetoric and strategy.
Nationalism was also a new and powerful source of tension in Europe. It was tied to militarism, and clashed with the interests of the imperial powers in Europe. Nationalism created new areas of interest over which nations could compete. For example, The Habsburg empire was tottering agglomeration of 11 different nationalities, with large slavic populations in Galicia and the Balkans whose nationalist aspirations ran counter to imperial cohesion.
Indeed, Serbian nationalism created the trigger cause of the conflict — the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The historical dialogue on this issue is vast and distorted by substantial biases. The notion that Germany was bursting with newfound strength, proud of her abilities and eager to showcase them, was overplayed.
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